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Credit Ratings and Sovereign Debt:  
The Political Economy of Creditworthiness through Risk and Uncertainty 
Bartholomew Paudyn 
Introduction: Credit Rating Crisis  
As the financial crisis morphed into the sovereign debt debacle, and escalating contagion 
undermined the integrity of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), plus the global 
economic recovery, international attention became fixated on what constitutes as the ‘real’ 
risk of sovereign debt default. While the immediate catastrophe may have been averted, for 
the moment, the legacy of the crisis still lingers on. Public finances remain strained as 
governments struggle to retain the investment grades necessary to finance their 
governmental operations at a reasonable cost. At the heart of the crisis, credit rating 
agencies (CRAs) have been lambasted for their ‘irresponsible’ behavior and the speculative 
activity that it fuels which, in the words of the former Greek Prime Minister, George 
Papandreou, has inflicted ‘psychological terror’ on the poor people of Europe (quoted in 
The Economist, 22 July 2010). To varying degrees, these ‘masters of risk’ – Moody’s 
Investors Service (Moody’s), Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch Ratings (Fitch) – dominate 
the ratings space and have been implicated in virtually every severe financial and fiscal 
crisis in recent memory.   
 Ranging from the 1998 Asian crisis to corporate scandals, such as the 2001 demise 
of the energy-trading giant Enron or the 2003 fraudulent Parmalat debacle, to the 2007-08 
credit crisis, these financial intermediaries have been blamed for a slew of erroneous 
assessments and for escalating market turmoil through their (rash or late) procyclical 
behavior (Gamble 2009; Kerwer 2005; Partnoy 2006; Sinclair 2005). High investment 
grade ratings were assigned to dodgy sub-prime backed securities one moment, only to 
witness these very ‘toxic assets’ implode the next (cf. Helleiner, Pagliari and Zimmermann 
2009). As economic conditions deteriorated and governments sought to secure the stability 
of their own financial sectors through multi-billion dollar rescue packages, subsequent 
sovereign downgrades helped the credit crisis mutate into one of sovereign debt.  
 Once again, rating agencies have become the target of consistent criticism for 
providing much of the firepower for the onslaught against an already beleaguered 
European periphery and, consequently, dashing hopes of a quick rebound from the depths 
of the ‘Great Recession’ of 2007/2009 (De Larosière Report 2009; FSB 2010; IMF 2010; 
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Issing Committee 2009; Turner Review 2009). Bond market speculation – often triggered 
by the coercive tactics of CRAs (Kerwer 2005: 461) – only aggravates the intense frictions 
which these crises fuel between rating agencies and government officials. Representative of 
an increasingly antagonistic relationship between private financial markets and democratic 
nation-states, sovereign governments must cope with the fact that the actions of a private 
entity can produce such severe public consequences. Rarely are the stakes any higher as the 
way that fiscal profligacy is rendered intelligible as a ‘problem of government’ (Miller and 
Rose 1990), and therefore the premium paid to finance borrowing, can adversely affect 
entire populations and even push economies into recession. If severe enough, this can 
provoke a bailout and impose strict ‘conditionality’ on the nation by outside forces.  
 Although recent turmoil has also cast a light on growing tensions with other 
financial institutions – most notably banks (see Rethel and Sinclair 2012) – arguably, as this 
book shows, nowhere does this struggle to constitute what counts as authoritative 
knowledge in the market play itself out more than in the ‘battle’ between sovereign states 
and Moody’s or S&P over the political economy of creditworthiness. Regulatory efforts to 
correct some of the most egregious elements of ratings may only compound the problem. 
Thus, through the sovereign debt crisis, and government attempts to manage its 
intensifying effects, we come to better understand the growing asymmetry in power 
between ‘epistocracy’ – knowledge-based rule – and ‘democracy’ (Collignon 2010; Estlund 
2008), the practices involved in its constitution, regeneration and sedimentation, as well as 
the subsequent consequences for markets and states.   
 Of course, these tensions are not restricted to Europe alone. Democratic 
governments around the world must vie with this unelected cabal of monopolists in the 
constitution of authoritative knowledge underpinning the ‘politics of limits’ – the 
construction of the parameters defining the budgetary realities facing governments. Ratings  
endow the problem of sovereign creditworthiness with ‘social facticity’ (Sinclair 2005). 
Presented as a calculable propensity towards fiscal failure, they help grant national officials 
access to liquid capital markets, and thus the necessary debt financing which helps facilitate 
programs of national self-determination, such as fiscal stimulus or health care. More 
favorable ratings translate into lower costs of borrowing.1 Conversely, those credit 
channels demand a higher premium, or dry up, with consecutive downgrades. Europe may 
be the most distressing and immediate example of the disruption – localized and systemic – 
which ensues but, to different degrees, this scenario plays itself out in the context of most 
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countries; especially with developing economies, such as the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China). Not even the United States is immune from such epistocracy; as its 5 August 
2011 downgrade from ‘AAA’ to ‘AA+’ by S&P demonstrates. Although the modulating effect 
of ratings varies according to the political economy, ostensibly, when financial markets 
dictate, sovereign governments seem to capitulate. In order to understand how this 
happens, the practice of rating sovereign creditworthiness must be problematized.  
 There are two dimensions to this struggle. On the one hand, this book demonstrates 
how a monopoly of private CRAs deploy their expertise in risk management – virtually free 
from any serious regulation – to set the terms (of creditworthiness) which compound the 
problems facing sovereign governments. Only three rating agencies can truly be labeled as 
global full-spectrum CRAs. Of these, Fitch remains a distant third in terms of prominence 
(Sinclair 2005: 1). Broad in product diversification, it is the scope and reach of their 
sovereign ratings which dwarf their nearest rivals. Whereas by 2011, Kroll Bond Ratings 
rated a mere 59 sovereigns, Moody’s issued 112 sovereign ratings, S&P 126, and Fitch 107 
(Kroll Bond Rating 2011; Moody’s Investors Service 2011a; Standard & Poor’s 2011a). 
Extrapolated to the broader context, the scale of this dominance becomes even more 
pronounced. Both the European Commission (2011a) and the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC 2009) calculate that the main three CRAs are responsible for a staggering 
95-97 per cent of all outstanding ratings across all categories. By definition, monopolies are 
inefficient (Friedman 1962). 
 What has unnerved governments around the globe – but especially in Europe – is 
the reckless use of the authority which, in large part, CRAs derive from their monopoly over 
the constitution of a ‘neoliberal’ or ‘advanced liberal’ politics of limits (Paudyn 2013; Rose 
1996). Integral to this apparatus of contemporary rule – where the entrepreneurialization 
of expertise allows it to exercise judgment over authority – risk ratings promote 
disinflationary logics aligned with what has become identified as Anglo-American versions 
of capitalism (Gamble 2009; Langley 2008a; Roy, Denzau and Willet 2007). Here curbed 
budgetary deficits are thought to help stabilize prices, and thus protect the value of assets; 
while keeping interest rates low. Deficit financing undermines confidence in the price 
stability oriented monetary policy of central banks and must be avoided (Friedman 1962). 
Self-systemic, and thereby self-regulating, the imposition of this neoliberal orthodoxy 
produces explosive effects – visible across Europe – as its uniform prescription of austerity 
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conflicts with heterogeneous, national forms of capitalism and the ‘singular nature’ of fiscal 
sovereignty to unleash unsuspecting forces of instability.    
On the other hand, there are beleaguered national governments whose deteriorated 
fiscal imbalances, and subsequent credit scores, undermine their capacity to finance their 
governmental operations – plus refinance existing debt obligations – on tolerable terms and 
establish the limits of political discretion in the economy. By no means should this conflict 
be misconstrued as a simple binary opposition between institutional agencies (CRAs) and 
uniform ‘democracies’. Neither sovereignty nor democracy is a natural or incontestable 
phenomenon. Variations between democratic political systems are extensive and profound. 
Acknowledgement of these unique contingencies and national characters is fundamental to 
the thrust of this argument. But the provision of programs in any context costs money. 
Austere budgets constrain the delivery of public goods which, if excessive, threaten to 
‘impose an intolerable economic sacrifice on [the] population’ (Moody’s Investors Service 
2008a: 6). Savage cuts in Greece have reduced public expenditure on health care by about 
25 per cent (US$12 billion) since the crisis began;2 with especially steep claw backs in 
hospital operating costs – €840 million in 2011 alone (European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies 2012: 13). Similar overhauls and structural reforms across the 
periphery of Europe point to why alignment with the disinflationary rationality advanced 
through sovereign ratings is so vital. Without those investment-grade scores (read 
borrowing capacity), the business of government is greatly impaired; or even stops.  
Unfortunately, given that the construction of ratings helps enable this particular 
social facticity of creditworthiness, the asymmetry is skewed in favor of ratings agencies. As 
a technology of financial control, to a great degree, the authoritative capacity of sovereign 
ratings to act on market participants stems from how convincingly ratings naturalize a 
(fictitious) bifurcation between the ‘economy’ and ‘politics’ in the constitution of what is 
considered as authoritative knowledge in the market; which mediates the legitimation of 
creditworthiness. Political discretion becomes increasingly marginalized and censured in 
the assessment and articulation of (uncertain) fiscal relations as normalizing 
mathematical/risk propriety models ‘depoliticize’ the decision-making process (de Goede 
2005; Langley 2008a; Luhmann 1993).  
Rather than simply ‘informed opinions’, it is through their ‘performative’ effects 
(Austin 1962; Callon 1998; MacKenzie 2004), as a socio-technical device of ‘control’  
(Deleuze 1995), that sovereign ratings promote this separation by ‘disassembling’ the 
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nation-state into a catalogue of analytical categories, such as (quantitative) debt dynamics 
or (qualitative) ‘political risks’, which, in turn, they claim to individually calculate and then 
reassemble again. Expertise mediates this representational process of surveillance as 
regulation, which seeks to divorce technoscientific epistemology from its messy politico-
economic context, through the deployment of defendable risk techniques (Miller 2001); a 
luxury not readily afforded to politicians or civil society. This dubious 
dissection/assessment helps to naturalize the impression that these constitutive elements 
which comprise a national political economy are distinctly autonomous spheres capable of 
ontological isolationism. As such, this rationality makes them more susceptible to and 
manageable through risk expertise.    
An infrastructure of referentiality – via the rating scale – is devised, denoting what 
‘correct’ and ‘normal’ fiscal conduct should entail, and thus the complexion of the politics of 
limits. Everyone covets the ‘AAA’ grade. Closest convergence with this normative 
disinflationary prescription helps earn that reward. The salience of sovereign ratings, 
therefore, derives from how persuasively they manage to constitute this neoliberal notion 
of budgetary normality as the hegemonic discourse against which democratic governments 
are judged and governed. As Ian Hacking (1990: vii) reminds us, normality ‘has become one 
of the most powerful ideological tools of the twentieth century ’. Increasingly, however, this 
prized status of creditworthiness is becoming ever more elusive as the balance that 
governments must strike between satisfying financial markets and being responsible to 
their electorates is proving extremely tenuous and fraught with what are, ostensibly, 
irreconcilable differences. Hence, this book explains how this ‘battle’ between CRAs and the 
European Union (EU) is reflective of the broader conflict between private markets and 
democratic sovereign states in the construction of the politics of limits.  
Given that so little is known about the actual act of sovereign rating, its capacity to 
exert isomorphic pressures on markets and governments to conform to a prescribed fiscal 
rectitude is striking. Obvious disjunctures between the (poor) performance of Moody’s and 
S&P, and their resiliency to remain at the heart of global finance, only contribute to this 
enigma. Sovereign ratings may be considered as ‘fugitive social facts’ (Holmes and Marcus 
2005: 237) or ‘black boxes’ (Mackenzie 2005) – whose overly secretive and technical 
internal structures make them opaque to outsiders. For a better understanding of how they 
shape the political economy of creditworthiness, they must be unpacked. Thus, insofar as 
ratings exercise a certain degree of control over the constitution of creditworthiness, what 
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serves to create the conditions and subjectivities that help to validate the specific 
(neoliberal) politics of limits advanced in sovereign ratings; which helps grant them their 
utility and authority? To this effect, how does the controlling performative capacity of 
sovereign bond ratings stem from how CRAs deploy and commercialize practices of risk 
and uncertainty? Furthermore, once operationalized what does the redefinition of this 
politics of limits mean for how competing notions of budgetary normality are ascertained 
and articulated, such as by politicians or civil society, and thus the relationship between 
democracy and epistocracy? Given that the ensuing asymmetry and antagonisms are not 
simply confined to Europe, it is also wise to ask how governments around the world  are 
managing to redress some of the most egregious elements of sovereign ratings in order to 
make themselves less susceptible to such destabilizing attacks? Insights into the dilemmas 
facing the ‘Atlantic Rim’ can then be applied to the looming conflicts on the ‘Pacific Rim’ (i.e., 
BRICs); as well as the home of Moody’s/S&P and that prolonged, but unavoidable, fiscal 
reckoning: America. 
How we understand the act of (sovereign) rating, and its institutional agency 
(CRAs), within the context of the sovereign debt crisis and the ability of governments to 
establish the parameters of the political within the economy is at the core of this book. Each 
one of these questions is addressed in the following chapters. Together they help 
problematize the political economy of creditworthiness to reveal the scope and severity of 
the difficulty facing democratic governments as they strive to reassert their sovereign 
authority to decide the complexion of their national fiscal politics in an increasingly 
depoliticizing field of global finance. For this purpose, it is necessary to determine how the 
authoritative knowledge underpinning the political economy of creditworthiness is 
constituted to render sovereign debt as a ‘knowable, calculable and administrable’ problem 
of government (Miller and Rose 1990: 5), aligned with perceptions of contingency and 
normality, and interwoven into the political discourse of nation-states. In other words, how 
budgetary profligacy is made into a social fact contributes to the development of this 
antagonistic relationship between the programmatic/expertise and operational/politics 
dimensions of fiscal governance. From this problematization, austere forms of intervention 
are derived to address noted deficits; which threaten to undermine the democratic 
legitimacy of elected governments. Sovereign credit ratings, therefore, are the internal 
forms of governmentality involved in the promotion and reiteration of a neoliberal politics 
of limits underpinning virtually all budgetary relations. 
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New Analytics of Sovereign Ratings 
In light of the intense scrutiny which rating agencies have received surrounding a litany of 
alleged abuses, a comprehensive account of their authoritative capacity to shape the 
political economy of creditworthiness is only thwarted by the glaring deficit in the 
International Political Economy (IPE) literature on the subject. As we shall see, the vast 
majority of contributions to the debate approach the problematic from two main fields of 
study: law and finance. What few IPE accounts that do exist tend to borrow extensively 
from them (e.g., Kerwer 2005; Kruck 2011). On the one hand, there are the legal 
perspectives (Hill 2004; Partnoy 2006; Schwarcz 2002) that conceptualize the rating 
agencies as a government-generated monopoly, which have been delegated their powers 
by the state. Governments have precipitated their own demise by endowing CRAs with the 
capacity to ‘possess’ a legal right, or a ‘regulatory license’ (Partnoy  1999), through vague 
certification schemes, such as the ‘Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’ 
(NRSRO) designation in the United States.3 Regulation is a significant factor in the visibility 
of ratings; especially mandates instructing which investment grade securities financial 
institutions can hold. Yet if it were only a matter of ‘merit regulation’ (Schwarcz 2002: 21) 
and a state enabled monopoly, then the recourse simply would be to strip CRAs of this legal 
leverage (Pollock 2005). But it is not that simple. 
On the other hand, there are an array of economists and financial analysts (Cantor 
and Packer 1995; Lowe 2002; Pollock 2005; Reinhart 2002) who stress factors like 
economies of scale and scope in their explanations of the rating space. Privileging an 
abstract ‘economistic’ notion of reality or power – similar to rating agencies themselves – 
they allude to a prediscursive economic materiality that only needs to be unearthed with 
the correct – primarily quantitative – tools. Neither of these approaches can adequately 
account for the relationship between the constitution of a specific form of authoritative 
knowledge and its reiteration, reproduction and sedimentation into a corresponding 
politics of limits underpinning budgetary relations. Intersubjective and discursive qualities 
are either neglected or rendered peripheral so as to be virtually irrelevant.  
 Now whether all this hoopla about CRA performance is justified or indicative of 
‘moral panic’ and a subsequent witch hunt, as alluded to by Tim Sinclair (2010: 93), is an 
interesting but, ultimately, distracting consideration. Such accounts attribute CRAs with an 
unwarranted amount of operational and explanatory power. Rating agencies are not the 
primary (exogenous) ‘causal variable’ that explains the chronic uncompetitiveness and 
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budgetary profligacy which has plagued the periphery of Europe or the bouts of 
hyperinflation which Brazil has suffered.4 Recognizing the procyclical bias inherent in 
ratings is one thing. But attempting to determine a ‘smoking gun’ and a purported causality 
towards fiscal failure or verify its probabilistic propensity, we are saddled with the 
painstaking burden of trying to calculate the exact frequency of fluid and uncertain fiscal 
relations at any one point in time. Unfortunately, armed with an arsenal of risk calculus and 
with an affinity for what Bill Maurer (2002: 29) identifies as the ‘fetishization of the normal 
distribution curve’, CRAs are prone to this exact tendency as they  betray their ‘desire to 
replicate the prescriptive and predictive success of the hard sciences and a belief in the 
infallibility of rationalist-empirical epistemology’ (Jarvis and Griffiths 2007: 17). If the 
threat of sovereign debt default can, in fact, be calculated as a real tangible phenomenon, 
then, according to conventional risk management, measuring (fiscal) variance through 
utilitarian risk calculus could transform the management of an indeterminate future into a 
regularly quantifiable exercise. ‘Refurbished’ through sophisticated methods of statistical 
actuarialism – dubbed ‘machineries of knowledge’ (Knorr Cetina 1999: 5) – the margin of 
error surrounding fiscal relations, purportedly, can be minimized to such a perceived extent 
that it is considered an objective account of reality. Reinforced by a rationalist 
understanding of capital markets, the supposed control afforded by such an approach helps 
explain why the discourse of risk is both seductive and hegemonic.   
 Excessive preoccupation with certainty equivalence, however, is misleading because 
the simplification of complex and interdependent social phenomena necessary for this 
endeavour distorts its conclusions and, arguably, dilutes them of any real significance. To 
frame the debate about the political economy of creditworthiness in these terms or to 
critique Moody’s and S&P for their failure to appropriate and deploy such predictive 
positivism successfully, simply drags us into assessing the veracity of claims about the 
genesis of finance or globalization and a certainty equivalence that just does not exist; 
namely how ‘capable’ and ‘willing’ politicians are to subject their constituents to harsh 
budgetary measures in the hope of  raising the resources necessary to service their debt 
obligations (Moody’s Investors Service 2008a: 4). As fallacious and distortive as this 
quantitatively-skewed approach – codified and commercialized as the ‘risk of default’ – is to 
the assessment and articulation of fiscal relations, readily accepting this ‘exogenou s’ 
understanding of creditworthiness, and thus the implied notion of ‘correct’ or ‘normal’ 
fiscal conduct with its corresponding credit score, is blind to the social construction of value 
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implicit in sovereign ratings (Sinclair 2010). Ratings are not objective brute facts, but 
contingent and contestable judgments about the credit health of a national political 
economy; especially its fiscal relations. Conflating and misrepresenting this social facticity 
as a natural ontology is what often precipitates, as well as exacerbates, crises.    
  Yet simply to discount such mainstream predictive positivism in favor of an 
intersubjective understanding of finance, without accounting for how exactly this social 
facticity of creditworthiness is constituted, reiterated and embedded in the global political 
economy, is both incomplete and inadequate. In the first instance, it tells us relatively little 
about how the authoritative capacity of Moody’s or S&P to act on global credit markets and 
governments is produced. Although the historical institutionalization of a distinct set of 
norms and rules surrounding creditworthiness, or what Sinclair (2005: 65-66) refers to as 
the ‘embedded knowledge network’, contributes to the clout of ratings agencies, in itself, it 
is insufficient in offering a comprehensive understanding of the specific discourses and 
practices through which this happens. Neither does it elucidate how CRAs have managed to 
sustain this authority in the face of a consistent stream of failures and lackluster 
performance. If credit ratings exert leverage because these judgments are believed to be 
consequential (Sinclair 2010: 92) then how do certain ideas and narratives gain traction 
while others fail to do so?  
 Epistemic authority (Blyth 2002; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Porter 2005; 
Power 2007) may be a much more refined line of argumentation than that offered by the 
few, poorly informed and narrow conventional economic or legal accounts which 
monopolize this field. Nevertheless, we are still left with rather vague concepts of 
‘confidence’ or ‘collective understanding’ from which to surmise how it is that the 
authoritative knowledge informing the problem of sovereign debt is actually legitimized 
through its construction and commodification. As this book demonstrates, the political 
economy of creditworthiness is more than just an epistemic community where actors – 
rational or otherwise – deliberately pick and choose to which judgment they adhere; 
essentially free from the normalizing effects of diverse and overlapping configurations of 
power.  
 Compounding these analytical deficits is not only the sense of urgency that these 
financial and fiscal crises are increasing in intensity and severity but, as noted above, the 
(distressing) paradox that their materialization seems to be connected to consistent, yet 
tolerated, failures. Again, existing accounts fail to provide an adequate explanation of how 
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this oddity persists or what it means for national self-determination in ever integrating 
global markets. Predominantly preoccupied with corporates, their cursory analysis often 
neglects the multiple dimensions of sovereign ratings, and their effects, in favor of pregiven 
absolutes, model consistency and propositions often derived from a structure versus 
agency thematic, that stress intentionality and the need to explain causality grounded in 
some innate ontological condition/origin.   
In order to remedy these omissions in the literature and determine how the act of 
(sovereign) rating helps to constitute and manage the political economy of 
creditworthiness, a new analytical instrumentality is necessary. For this purpose, the fields 
of the ‘social studies of finance’ (Callon 1998; Knorr Cetina and Preda 2005; Langley 2008a; 
MacKenzie 2006) and the Foucauldian-inspired ‘governmentality’ literature (Aitken 2007; 
Barry, Osborne and Rose 1996; Dean 1999; O’Malley 2004) provide a number of promising 
intellectual points of departure. By problematizing the role of credit ratings in the sovereign 
debt crisis, these frameworks help ‘decentre’ finance to illuminate how formulations of 
social facticity are derived from specific ‘techniques of truth production’  (Foucault 1980); 
whereby action and authority combine to ‘govern-at-a-distance’ (Miller and Rose 1990).  
Performativity helps reveal how these systems of surveillance, calculative 
techniques, and proprietary models/methodologies featured in the ratings process form 
spaces of calculability and apparatuses of control; upon which this neoliberal politics of 
limits is predicated. Representations demarcating the limits of debt financing, and thus 
fiscal possibility, reflect ‘a circulating operation of power that constitutes agents and their 
interests’ (de Goede 2005: 10). Sovereign debt and its constitutive subjectivities are  made 
into specific objects and subjects of government through the dominant modalities of risk 
and uncertainty. An analytics of government allows us to appreciate how this happens by 
disentangling what is portrayed as supposedly totalizing and monolithic – by the literature 
and CRAs themselves – through an empirically-based analysis of the various styles of 
constituting creditworthiness and governing the ratings space.  
 
Socio-Technical Devices of Control 
A central theme running through this book is how the ‘opinions’ of a private agency can 
produce grave public repercussions, which threaten to undermine the democratic 
legitimacy of elected governments, as they become social facts. By framing the sovereign 
debt debate according to a specific neoliberal market mentality prizing austerity and low 
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budget deficits, ratings help exert a considerable constraining force on economic modes of 
governance discordant with its strict disinflationary rationality. With the notable 
exceptions of the UK or perhaps even the German-centered hub, the debt crisis has revealed 
how arduous acceptance of this approach is for most political economies. Alignment, 
however, is straining for most as severe costs of adjustment provoke socio -political 
contestation and backlash; especially on the periphery of Europe. How EU subjects strive to 
adhere to specific ratings, designed in the name of budgetary rectitude, is shaped by the 
very power relations in which they are embedded.  
 With risk, post-disciplinary logics of ‘control’ acknowledge that fiscal failure is 
possible across multiple sites of this EU space (Deleuze 1995: 169-176). Member States are 
envisioned as ‘misfits’ who are in danger of sabotaging their budgetary positions. Their 
profligate propensities must be curbed at all sites of potential deviation. Whereas 
individualization and normalization characterize discipline, whereby the subject is 
fundamentally reformed, regimes of control regulate deviance. Sovereign ratings, therefore, 
have a ‘programmatic’ effect of modulating budgetary conduct. Their salience derives from 
the capacity of ratings to devise this neoliberal benchmark of budgetary rectitude to which 
democratic governments are subjected. Progress is monitored in accordance with the 
infrastructure of referentiality that ratings construct, which connects notions of proper 
fiscal conduct (i.e., neoliberal orthodoxy) with economic behavior (of markets and 
governments). Closest convergence earns the coveted, but evermore elusive, ‘AAA’ grade. 
 Control as calculation/classification is revealed and institutionalized through this 
technocratic process; whereby surveillance of the accidental claims to transform nation-
states into measureable and administrable objects of government. The successful 
normalization of this regime of control is predicated on how convincingly CRAs manage to 
bifurcate ‘economics’ and ‘politics’. Separated into distinct and isolated variables, these 
categories appear more amenable to a utilitarian calculus of risk. Defendable mathematical 
techniques are typically considered more legitimate and compelling than temperamental 
politicians with a reputation for dithering and grandiose proclamations which often 
disappoint. The exertion of such control, however, ‘depoliticizes’ the constitution of the 
political economy of creditworthiness by invalidating how competing notions of budgetary 
normality are assessed and articulated. At once, therefore, risk calculus claims to identify 
the specific problem(s) of fiscal management and offer corresponding solutions. 
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Control may be one of the more visible configurations of financial power through 
which this expert knowledge denoting what is considered permissible in budgetary affairs 
‘[acts] upon the real’ to configure the contours of the ratings space and its subjectivities,  but 
it is not the only one (Miller and Rose 1990: 7). Multiple forms of authority exist 
simultaneously along the power/knowledge axis – delineated by Foucault (1980) – which 
are relevant for the current discussion of how sovereign creditworthiness is rendered 
visible and its corresponding challenges manageable. 
 Unfortunately, mainstream accounts typically tend to frame this debate primarily in 
terms of either a loss of ‘sovereignty’ or the ‘structural’ capacity of finance to restrict  
national competence over the budgetary process (i.e., sovereignty again) without any 
serious consideration for the diverse and overlapping power relations that condition the 
very discursive constitution of agency and interests. Little heed is paid to the articulation 
and codification of authority which is ‘not possessed as a thing or transferred as a property’ 
(Foucault 1979: 176), nor operates based on exclusion or domination. Forms of ‘discipline’  
and ‘governmentality’, or the ‘conduct of conduct’, which works on freedom in the 
construction of self-regulating subjectivities in the performativity of the ratings space, are 
omitted in favor of an ‘economistic conception of power’ as a commodity (Campbell 1996: 
18), an ideational construct – often ‘austerity’ – or some underlying logic of capital divorced 
from the techniques of truth production themselves. But ‘it is the apparatus as a whole that 
produces “power” and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field ’ 
(Foucault 1979: 177); as governmental mentalities and technologies are connected 
together to give meaning and authority to particular modes of calculating and  managing 
this assemblage. The reduction of power relations to one principal form or single locus, 
which is external to the sites of its political economy, fails to account for its productive 
potential in devising a politics of limits.   
This book seeks to redress this deficiency by drawing our attention to how authority 
‘is attached to social positions that are relationally defined’ rather than exogenously given 
(Wight 2006: 152). Power flows in localized sites to establish its own objects of 
government. Although self-discipline is exercised in these fields, as ratings help induce the 
internalization of self-regulation in actors across the domains of government and the 
investment community, arguably, it is through the modulation of deviance (control), against 
a risk-constructed fiscal normality, whereby sovereign ratings exert significant leverage. 
Thus, by problematizing the act of rating, we become more attentive to how ‘power is 
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embedded within the discursive formations that naturalise [a fiscal] normality’ and 
‘motivate the reproduction of normal populations through associated practices ’ (Lipschutz 
and Rowe 2005: 56).    
Now whether anticipating ‘possible loci of dangerous  irruptions through the 
identification of sites statistically locatable in relation to norms and means’ (Castel in Rose  
1999: 235) is plausible for diverse sovereigns is debatable. First, as noted above and 
developed in subsequent chapters, the complexities and interdependencies of the social 
phenomena under study prevent their simplification through such arbitrary division. 
National politics and economics are inexorably intertwined with a plethora of  
social/cultural elements in variegated configurations of mutually reinforcing and 
contradicting assemblages. Not only does this analysis dispute the rigid juxtaposition 
between economics/politics but we also move beyond the false international/domestic, 
subject/object or private/public binary oppositions that are frequently propagated by 
conventional accounts.  
Next, technoscientific epistemology cannot be readily divorced from the politico-
economic contexts in which it is embedded. Of course, rendering informal judgment explicit 
detracts from the thrust and leverage of risk’s calculative control. Deliberately discounting 
the degree of contingency implicit in sovereign ratings fortifies its bulwark. Muted and 
disguised, risk’s veracity is largely immunized from political contestation. Moody’s and S&P 
may reap a greater advantage from such risk calculus because their ratings are produced 
for the market and public consumption. Cognizant that the fixed income desks at PIMCO or 
a hedge fund are more focused on devising internal assessments for their own range of 
funds, which grants them the flexibility to be more open about their discretionary conduct, 
the differences in their analytics usually are not substantial. Risk dominant technicals assist 
in justifying active investment strategies to clients.  
Just because it is dubious, however, does not necessarily mean that this calculative 
practice is devoid of any capacity to act on governments and markets. After all, the 
authoritative expert knowledge underpinning financial markets need not rest on some 
unequivocal and objective truth. Social facts help construct these spaces of calculability and 
dictate their movements. Modulation is visible through the performative effects of ratings; 
thereby endowing them with a temporal ‘stability’ and social facticity that they otherwise 
may not possess. In other words, ratings are a socio-technical device of control, which 
create the very conditions and subjectivities that help validate their prescriptive 
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(neoliberal) program. What is called ‘finance’ materializes through the circulation and 
reiteration of these specific discursive practices (de Goede 2005: 7). Control is visible in the 
constitution of three main subjectivities implicated in the sovereign debt crisis: CRAs, 
investors and governments. Although the effectiveness and longevity of this performativity 
is vulnerable to disruption, and even crisis, the purported ability to manipulate the 
constitution and validation of the problem of sovereign debt through risk strengthens  the 
capacity of sovereign ratings to control compliance.  
The modulating effect of risk ratings, however, is not uniform. Convergence through 
compliance – and the level of antagonism – depends on the degree to which the 
organization and management of the national economy is aligned with the disinflationary 
logics of neoliberalism privileged in ratings. Political imperatives are often thought to 
encourage unsound budgetary measures that compromise economic fundamentals by 
threatening to increase inflationary pressures through fiscal expansion (Issing 2004; 
Stiglitz and Greenwald 2003; Whitley 1986). The greater the supposition that policy 
discretion interferes with the ‘efficient’ unfettered functioning of market dynamics, the 
more that it is perceived as a liability to be mitigated (Hay 2007: 56). Bolstered by this 
(questionable) reading of the ‘economy’ as an exogenous reality prior to or outside of its 
discursive constitution, the control of ratings is commensurate with the degree of 
receptivity and applicability of this doctrine. Financial markets broadly speaking, but bond 
markets more specifically, subscribe to this rationality. Occasionally, pressures for fiscal 
consolidation may even allow shrewd leaders to insulate themselves behind ratings 
(Posner and Blöndal 2012). Strong opposition across Europe – both ideological and 
practical – to the imposition of this Anglo-American model, and the consequent attacks on 
‘continental’ forms of social democratic capitalism, however, is helping fuel a politics of 
resilience and resistance that may threaten to disturb the modulating force of risk’s 
performation.      
Acknowledging that the antagonistic relationship which develops between the 
‘programmatic’ elements of financial expertise and the ‘operational’ aspects of budgetary 
politics – in the struggle to define the politics of limits – is not restricted to a few fiscal 
misfits on the periphery of Europe, the European sovereign debt crisis does provide an 
informative context for how it plays out and what lessons may be drawn. Not only is this, 
arguably, the most severe and protracted manifestation of this  conflict between private 
credit markets and democratic sovereign states in the construction of the politics of limits  
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thus far, but its ramifications are, indeed, international; with spill-over effects for both 
advanced and emerging economies. Although the recent 2006 US Rating Agency Reform Act 
may have introduced criteria clarifying what designations, such as the NRSRO, actually 
entail, it is the EU CRA Framework – Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 (CRA Regulation v1); 
its amendments (EU) No 513/2011 (CRA Regulation v2); and (EU) No 462/2013 (CRA 
Regulation v3) – that is the most comprehensive and ambitious attempt to manage the 
ratings space to date. By anchoring a portion of the discussion in the EU regulatory 
response, we are better positioned to decipher how the recent 2007-08 credit crisis, and 
subsequent sovereign debt woes, prompted a shift in the governance of ratings from a 
largely haphazard approach riddled with ambiguities and voluntary measures to a 
decidedly more proactive policy stance.  
Exacting a greater adherence to protocol and information flows from CRAs than 
ever before, proponents may claim that it is an extensive, if not demanding, regulatory 
regime; which may serve as a role model for other jurisdictions.5 No doubt, the CRA 
framework is in-depth and comprehensive. Unfortunately, equating crisis management as 
synonymous with risk management, it is a reactionary approach which is plagued by a 
misguided preoccupation with governing this threat as a primarily exogenous shock; 
without any serious consideration of its endogenous dimensions. Neglectful of how the 
social facticity of creditworthiness is constructed and legitimized, the EU may jeopardize its 
own crisis response by (inadvertently) subjecting itself to unintended consequences and 
supervisory conflicts. Rather than rectify the growing asymmetry, recourse to the kind of 
fragmentation and quantification implied in risk management may only exacerbate it. Since 
the instability inside the eurozone has already spilled across its borders to affect adversely, 
amongst other things, the ‘risk appetite’ of financial markets for the emerging South, the 
fates of Europe and the BRICs, to varying degrees, are intimately connected together. At this 
point, however, I only identify the South’s tumultuous relationship with the ratings 
agencies and offer some nuanced suggestions of how it may develop in the future. Digesting 
what the current tensions in Europe signal for the relationship between epistocracy and 
democracy offers some insights into how this political economy of creditworthiness may 
affect the BRICs.   
What is clearer is that across much of the world, governments have been facing 
austere pressures that undermine national fiscal sovereignty. Variegated notions of 
budgetary normality, which privilege greater degrees of social democracy and solidarity 
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through schemes such as protected public pensions or greater collective bar gaining (Hall 
and Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2002), are not accommodated by the aggregating techniques of 
sovereign ratings. Such analysis would preclude the ‘narrow rating range’ for which 
Moody’s strives; even though the company admits that ‘the unusual characteristics of a 
sovereign credit may not be fully captured by this approach’ (Moody’s  Investors Service 
2008a: 1). As Member States succumb to harsh neoliberal programs of deep expenditure 
cuts, privatization and deregulation necessary to secure debt financing and function, 
‘powerful neoliberalizing tendencies…threaten the incremental dilution’ of continental 
forms of social democracy (Hay 2007: 257). Traditional varieties of capitalism associated 
with more generous welfare provisions are often considered corrosive to a good credit 
rating. Compliance (read austerity) through control depoliticizes what has conventionally 
been within political purview; as quantitative techniques pronounce qualitative judgments. 
That is until fiscal sovereignty unleashes unsuspecting forces contingent on the ‘singular 
nature of sovereignty’ and its vicissitudes (Moody’s Investor s Service 2008a: 6).  
 
Government through Risk and Uncertainty 
Grounded in the discourse of risk, this book argues that sovereign ratings act as a socio-
technical device of control and governmentality, which subject fiscal politics to an artificial 
uniformity. Risk serves to advance and validate this neoliberal politics of limits. Few would 
deny the growth and prevalence of risk as an organizational and regulatory narrative in our 
society today (Beck 1999; Beckert 2002; Clark, Dixon and Monk 2009; Power 2004). Its 
ubiquity enhances its prominence so as to give the impression that it is a neutral, or even a 
propitious, approach to most managerial problems. Attempts to shift away from human 
competencies and critical judgment towards to the primacy of quantitative techniques – no 
matter how dubious – are reflective of a rationality that privileges the authority and 
imperatives of the market/shareholder over those of the citizen.  
 Such a mentality is noticeable in the push to increase the surveillance authority of 
risk through measures like credit-scoring systems (Langley 2008b; Leyshon and Thrift 
1999), reputational metrics (Power 2007) or insurance (Ericson and Doyle 2004; O’Malley 
2004). Peter Miller (2001) contends how, by treating organizations as an enterprise, 
management accounting produces calculating subjects whose freedom to self-regulate is 
greatly circumscribed by the networks in which they operate. By arranging relationships 
according to inclusive-exclusive and differentiated categories, risk and uncertainty act as 
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‘boundary objects’ immanent in such strategies of control. Boundary objects straddle 
multiple spaces and are ‘both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints, yet 
robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites’ (Bowker and Star 1999: 297). 
Differentiation is central to the political economy of creditworthiness. Ratings judge and 
identify which debt profiles are considered ‘investment-grade’, and should be granted 
access to capital markets as ‘deserving’ bond issuers. Those deemed less creditworthy 
experience much more difficulty in obtaining the necessary financing and – relegated to 
‘junk’ (below ‘BBB-’) – must often seek emergency bailouts or default. Accordingly, this 
book shows how fundamental these modalities are to the promotion and maintenance of 
the self-sustaining Anglo-American market logics.  
 In the ratings space, I submit that the ‘importation’ of tenets and methodologies 
from the corporate sector into the sovereign domain has served to enhance the prevalence 
and sustaining power of sovereign ratings through their alignment with a  defendable, 
utilitarian calculus of risk. More tractable to rational choice modeling, to a great extent, 
risk’s appeal rests on the claim that its ergodicity and ‘machine-like’ ability can fragment 
and minimize interfering variables, such as human discretion, and thus reduce volatility 
from the equation (Best 2010: 36). Devoid of these idiosyncrasies, the calculation of an 
indeterminate (fiscal) future purportedly becomes more feasible and accurate; thereby 
bringing us closer to some ‘objective’ truth about an exogenous reality. Technical expertise, 
as Sinclair (1994: 454) reminds us, gives the impression that CRAs ‘disavow any ideological 
content to their rating judgments’. In sharp contrast, the politically charged EU and BRICs 
are hotbeds of ideological temperaments. Risk is deployed to mollify these in order to 
preclude their ‘adverse’ consequences.  
 Subjective estimations are prone to ‘serious inconsistencies’ that produce ‘bias 
ratings’ (Johnson et al. 1990: 95). Such optics are exactly what CRAs attempt to avoid since 
they damage their credibility and diminish the leverage of ratings. By deploying and 
commodifying particular calculative risk techniques, however, rating agencies can help 
mediate this representational process in their favor to mask such contingent liabilities. 
Consequently, the supposed enhancement of transparency through the elevation of 
quantitative practices, which strive to control performance, have depoliticizing effects as 
risk ratings serve to invalidate alternative – often democratically-based – ways of 
ascertaining and articulating budgetary rectitude. Politics of representation and discursive 
practices are virtually ignored in favor of normalizing risk models. Ostensibly, this works to 
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shield technical knowledge from contestation by ‘immunizing decision-making against 
failure’ (Luhmann 1993: 13). Their commercialization only reinforces the authoritative 
capacity of ratings as the market is perceived as a legitimizing vehicle. Through a diagnosis 
of the performativity behind the political economy of creditworthiness, however, we are 
better able to disturb the unequivocal hegemony of this principal but, arguably, 
problematic, governmental category and discourse. 
   Irrespective of its numerous applications and benefits, a closer examination reveals 
a darker underbelly to risk management; especially when applied to fiscal relations. Recent 
frictions, in Europe – and around the world – are challenging this orthodoxy’s dominance as 
a mode of governance. Seldom problematized, uncertainty and risk are often treated as self-
evident or monolithic. Perceived as tangible phenomena, the task involves searching for 
some exogenous ontological reality to unearth. Unfortunately, the consequence of this 
recursive search for certainty equivalence binds us to determining the actual displacement 
of one thing called ‘uncertainty’ by the other labeled ‘risk’. Such an economistic conception 
of risk, however, neglects its permanent state of virtuality (van Loon 2002: 2). Once it 
happens, and a static figure is available, it is now a full-blown crisis and no longer a 
probability. Attempts to capture risk as a thing to be manipulated and assigned a numerical 
quadrant may give the impression of heightened control over fiscal indeterminacy. But it is 
a misleading mirage that distorts risk’s temporal flux without offering any satisfactory 
explanation of how the quantitative (risk) and qualitative (uncertainty) parameters are 
accommodated and synthesized to render any sort of displacement possible or fixed figure 
tenable.  
 Distortions such as this are propagated by mainstream IPE. As an inescapable by-
product of modernity, uncertainty is either conceptualized as an ‘incalculable risk’ to be 
feared, as espoused by the ‘risk society’ thesis (Beck 1999; Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994), 
or celebrated (Bernstein 1998). Technological advancements like statistical actuarialism 
and enhanced information systems supposedly enable experts, such as auditors or rating 
agencies, to patrol the margins of indeterminacy between risk and uncertainty. With the 
right ‘tools’, they claim to translate more contingent events into statistical probabilities; 
which makes them tractable to rational choice modeling of a predictive Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium (Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001; Reddy 1996). No longer at the whims of the gods, 
we are told that uncertainty can be transformed into a risk once it becomes organized 
through our management systems (Power 2007: 6). Either we are faced with inescapable 
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conditions, where discursivity and performativity are virtually neglected, or we must 
accept that systems for representing risk ‘emerge as generic and totalizing instruments of 
risk governance’ (Power 2007: 4). Neither one is satisfactory.   
It is the discursivity and diversity of these socio-technical devices of control which 
help elucidate how ratings produce an authoritative capacity to act on market participants 
by promoting a false dichotomy between risk and uncertainty. As the discussion turns to 
searching for tangible phenomena and calculating their ontological coordinates, a rigid 
binary opposition develops; whereby risk is defined as a calculable ‘measure of variance 
around an expected value’ – represented as ‘AAA’ – while uncertainty escapes being 
captured as such a statistical probability (Cantor and Packer 1995; Chorafas 2007: 24; 
Hardy 1923; Short 1992). Since their construction enables the social facticity of ratings, 
adherence to such a predictive, and thereby prescriptive, positivism sets up an unnecessary 
conundrum where this fictitious dichotomy between (quantitative) risk and (qualitative) 
uncertainty is promoted and institutionalized. Unfortunately, the veracity of this dualism is 
rarely problematized as attention shifts to competing claims about what constitutes as the 
correct risk model or better methodology. Mechanics, and their potentially lucrative 
monetary incentives, monopolize the debate to such an extent that few bother to question 
whether an analytics sanctioning the simple bifurcation of risk and uncertainty, or between 
politics and economics for that matter, is actually apposite.    
Informal judgment diminishes in utility and value with the reiteration of this 
juxtaposition. It is the regenerative hegemony of this discourse which underpins the CRA 
conviction that any ‘qualitative elements are integrated within a structured and disciplined 
framework so that subjectivity is constrained’ through the ‘continuous effort to make the 
analysis more quantitative’ (Moody’s Investors Service 2008a: 6). In other words, there is a 
concerted effort to transform (singular) fiscal uncertainties into (aggregate) pools of risk; 
which amounts to their misrepresentation.  
 A reading that treats risk and uncertainty as unproblematic brute facts, however, 
and thus burdens us with the onerous search for ontological equivalence in fluid fiscal 
relations where none exists, is blind to their dialectical relationship. Neither risk nor 
uncertainty is inherently more or less abundant during the sovereign debt crisis.  Rather 
than one of mutual exclusion or innate abundance/scarcity, their relationship, as Pat 
O’Malley (2000) contends, is contestable and heteromorphic. They change depending on 
how they are deployed. Suspending the search of their ‘real’ ontological coord inates 
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provides an enhanced understanding of how CRAs mobilize the constructs of uncertainty 
and risk as modalities in the discursive constitution and legitimation of sovereign debt as a 
problem of government.  
 As modes of governance, risk and uncertainty are considered ‘ways in which the real 
is imagined to be by specific regimes of government, in order that it may be governed’ 
(O’Malley 2004: 15). Through the construct of risk, sovereign debt is rendered intelligible 
as a primarily quantifiable, probabilistic frequency towards fiscal failure (Sy 2004). 
Management through uncertainty, however, cannot be systematically orchestrated because 
it fails to reproduce itself at regular intervals. Informal judgment and seasoned guesswork 
play a greater role in devising a credit score (de Goede 2005). Sovereign rating ranges, 
ultimately, rest on a judgment about the extent to which politicians will subject their 
constituents to ‘tolerable’ costs of austerity/adjustment (Sinclair 2005: 138); which is a 
synthesis of quantitative and qualitative calculations. Unfortunately, the utilitarian calculus 
of risk cannot readily capture this degree of exigency involved in the fiscal politics being 
monitored as a statistical probability. This book reveals how the costs – to populations and 
markets – grow in enormity as a form of dysfunctional information exchange becomes 
institutionalized and fiscal sovereignty diminishes. 
 Cognizant of selling largely qualitative opinions – especially in regards to sovereigns 
– Sinclair (2005: 34) contends how ‘quick’ rating agencies are ‘to use the objectifying cloak 
of economic and financial analysis and, as it were, hide behind the numbers when it is 
easier than justifying what may, in fact, be a difficult judgment’ . Based on a fictitious 
quantitative/qualitative binary opposition, aggregating methods that attempt to transform 
singular fiscal uncertainties into pools of risk seem to help in the comparison and 
adjustment of the diachronic through the synchronic (Sinclair 2005: 58-59). As the problem 
of sovereign debt becomes more manageable, a prescriptive (artificially uniform) fiscal 
normality is validated. Nevertheless, as illustrated by recent crises, the distortion of 
contingent liabilities and misrepresentation of fiscal relations produces explosive effects.  
What is revealing is how this predication on the hegemonic discourse of risk actually 
fails to secure organizational integrity; instead precipitating volatility and financial/fiscal 
crisis. Conflating (immeasurable) uncertainty with (probabilistic) risk, and lacking the 
correct conditions of felicity – grounded in their respective (unique) national contexts – the 
success of these socio-technical devices of control is called into question as risk-based 
performativity becomes vulnerable to ‘misfire’ or breakdown (Callon 2010). As these 
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isomorphic pressures exerted by ratings clash with the heterogeneity of national political 
economies – wherever they are located – they precipitate backlash as fiscal sovereignty 
reasserts itself in the face of the unbearable costs of adjustment. Populations can only 
tolerate so much austerity before the cuts prove too deep.  
 
Performative Political Economy of Creditworthiness 
In large part, as this book argues, what is problematic about the authoritative capacity of 
sovereign ratings is that it is based on a misrepresentation of immeasurable (qualitative) 
uncertainties as probabilistic (quantitative) risks. Commercialization of this false 
dichotomy only bolsters its salience. Now if the effects of such inconsistencies were 
negligible, and ratings were only ‘informed opinions’ devoid of any performativity, then it 
would be easier to disregard them. After all, given that often movements in structural 
macroeconomic or financial market conditions are already pr iced into the market (e.g., 
bond yields, credit default swaps), the utility of ratings is considered marginal. Novelty, 
however, is not their hallmark.  
 The performativity of ratings ‘is not to represent what was previously 
unrepresented, but try and reorganize the circulation and control of representations’ 
(Mitchell 2007: 267). Their authoritative leverage, arguably, is derived of how well they 
manipulate the constitution of sovereign debt as a particular problem of government – 
represented through a simple yet hierarchical infrastructure of referentiality – which could 
otherwise assume a different complexion; if not for the depoliticizing effects of ratings. 
Sovereign ratings do not actually eliminate the volatility and contingency implicit in fiscal 
politics. Rather represented in a different – more quantitative – form, they only give the 
impression of it being mitigated. Nevertheless, through this specific assemblage, which is 
simultaneously mechanic and enunciatory (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 504), sovereign 
ratings are endowed with a social facticity that allows them to function as socio -technical 
devices of control in the constitution of a neoliberal politics of limits.        
In order to understand how the operationalization of these modes of governance 
serves to redefine the budgetary realities facing governments around the world, and thus 
strengthen an epistocratic grip over democratic forms of rule, its performativity is 
problematized. The contention developed in the following chapters is that the authoritative 
capacity of ratings is constituted/reinforced through their performative effects; which 
create the conditions and subjectivities that serve to validate this epistemic/discursive 
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framework, and in the process their utility and leverage. By focusing our attention on the 
specific subjects implicated in a debt crisis (i.e., CRAs, investors, and governments) and the 
empirical domains where this puzzle is rendered real, performativity combines the  
relationship between action and authority to yield an enhanced understanding of the 
construction, regeneration and sedimentation of this disinflationary political economy of 
creditworthiness; without succumbing to the limits of the ‘structure versus agency’ debate 
and its need to explain either agential intentionality or causality.  
In his widely acclaimed contribution to the performativity literature, The Laws of 
Markets, Michel Callon (1998: 23) argues that economic theories and formulas ‘do not 
merely record a reality independent of themselves; they contribute powerfully to shaping, 
simply by measuring it, the reality that they measure’. Referring to Deleuze and Guattar i’s 
(1987) notion of agencement, Callon (2007: 320-21) argues that economic formulas 
perform the worlds they suppose into existence. Agencement captures both the assemblage 
and agential dimensions of performativity without reducing it to either one. A hybrid of 
human and non-human entities (i.e., material, technical, textual devices), ‘agencements 
denote socio-technical arrangements when they are considered from the point [of] view of 
their capacity to act and to give meaning to action’ (Callon and Caliskan 2005: 24 -25). 
Analyzing how the calculative act of sovereign rating enables and exemplifies a ‘socio-
technical agencement’ of creditworthiness reveals both its mechanistic non-human (risk) 
and discretionary human (uncertainty) elements. This provides an enhanced 
understanding of how action and authority combine to devise a political economy of 
creditworthiness according to which fiscal profligacy is assessed and corrective measures 
proposed (e.g., default). At the same time, the commonalities which exist between various 
agencements of creditworthiness – especially between corporates and sovereigns – are 
rendered visible. Similarities, however, do not guarantee their performative success in 
different spaces. Conditions of felicity are necessary for their programmatic actualization. 
Otherwise, lacking these favorable circumstances, the result is misfire . 
Two dimensions to this performativity are discernible. First, given their procedural 
dimension, as a discursive practice, sovereign ratings have ‘illocutionary’ performative 
effects (Austin 1962; Callon 2010). Through their description of budgetary positions, such 
as ‘junk’, these utterances communicate a range of judgments about proper fiscal conduct, 
which inform the constitution of a politics of limits. Formulated through a readily 
identifiable scale, ratings are how this (neoliberal) normative statement about 
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creditworthiness gets translated into practice. Against this mentality, a government’s 
creditworthiness is assessed and its capability to perform the fundamental functions of 
‘government’ (i.e., finance programs for citizens) is hindered with each subsequent 
downgrade.  
Yet credit ratings are not simply a linguistic process. ‘Perlocutionary’ performative 
effects of this austere political economy of creditworthiness are visible on the broader 
governmental assemblage, which depend on the reality produced by said ratings in order to 
dictate successfully how fiscal sovereignty should be exercised. The effective control of 
ratings to provoke the prescribed disinflationary management of government finances is 
intimately linked to the naturalization of the neoliberal logics implied in and promoted by 
said ratings. Performativity in action, or what Callon (2007: 330) refers to as ‘performation’, 
‘encompasses [the] expression, self-fulfilling prophesies, prescription, and performance’ of 
varying degrees of budgetary prudence or profligacy, which endow the problem of 
government debt with social facticity and create the conditions where it is enacted and 
reproduced. A politics of limits is constituted through sovereign ratings which privileges 
and naturalizes the separation between economics and politics so as to elevate the position 
of expertise relative to that of democratic governments. However persuasive this looks on 
paper, there is a fundamental disjuncture between the artificial normality of this purported 
fiscal reality and the diverse political economies around the globe.  
As contestation abounds, Callon (2010: 164) is correct to assert that the success of 
illocutionary performativity is only temporary because its capacity ‘to make inactive and 
invisible [its] overflowing and misfires’ for an extended period of time is dubious. There is a 
critical breaking point; after which the performativity of ratings fails to engender 
successfully a disinflationary program as governments begin to take measured steps to 
repoliticize the discourse and enact policies to protect their citizens. In the European 
context, ratings may eventually precipitate the ‘converse’ of what they describe to alter 
political economy ‘in such a way that [their] empirical accuracy...is undermined’ , or what 
MacKenzie (2006: 19) labels as ‘counterperformativity’.  
Budgetary politics is replete with numerous exigencies which, when excessively 
aggravated, can randomly sabotage the programmatic ambitions of its surveillance to refute 
ratings. The practical adoption of sovereign ratings, and thus an adherence to their 
neoliberal program can, in fact, serve to hinder convergence towards their prescribed fiscal 
normality. In this instance, however, it is not only the empirical validity of the model itself 
24 
 
(read sovereign ratings) that is the focus. Of significance is also how sovereign ratings can 
jeopardize their own programmatic ambitions by creating the very conditions which refute 
their disinflationary rationalities and further impair their calculative capability. In the 
attempt to satisfy its austere masters (i.e., IMF, ECB and Germany), a country like Greece or 
Portugal may impose intolerable costs on its citizens, which can trigger a violent backlash 
and a prolonged civil unrest; whereby the politics of resilience/resistance attempt to 
reclaim lost fiscal sovereignty. At this critical juncture, increasingly governments shift from 
appeasing financial markets to protecting their own citizens.  
How much this growing austerity fatigue will be tolerated before boiling over and 
forcing governments to take measured steps to repoliticize the discourse is quite uncertain. 
Transposing risk techniques from the corporate sector may seem to borrow some 
semblance of control over an otherwise volatile and uncertain fiscal landscape. But without 
the appropriate felicitous conditions rooted in the dynamics of national budgetary 
sovereignty to sustain this performativity, this approach is vulnerable to failure (Callon 
2007). Here the uncertainty of fiscal relations challenges the performativity of sovereign 
ratings to secure a politics of limits through risk. Tensions flare and crisis looms as this 
(nominal) artificial fiscal normality imposes (real) severe, socio-political costs on the 
populations of heterogeneous economies. As it ruptures, it further engenders an 
antagonistic relationship between the programmatic (neoliberal expertise/risk) and 
operational (social democratic politics/uncertainty) dimensions of fiscal governance whose 
severity cannot be forecast with any certainty. What constitutes as the ‘political’ in the 
economy becomes revealed and renegotiated. Technical practices become susceptible to 
repoliticization – albeit temporarily. Slowly, the grip of Anglo-American capitalism becomes 
resented; and even disturbed. 
 
Overview  
The overarching focus of this book is the way sovereign ratings help constitute and validate 
a (neoliberal) politics of limits underpinning fiscal relations and the ensuing conflictual 
relationship between the imperatives of private markets/expertise and democratic 
governments in establishing how political discretion is exercised in the economy. At the 
heart of this power struggle is the construction and commodification of authoritative 
knowledge underpinning the social facticity of sovereign creditworthiness. My contention 
is that the relative obscurity and neglect of the exact production, regeneration and 
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sedimentation of this austere fiscal normality needs to be redressed in order to help 
illuminate some of the serious inconsistencies which permit this asymmetry to continue 
with its intensifying effects. Unless these ‘black boxes’ are unpacked to reveal how the 
problem of sovereign debt is formulated and legitimized through a specific configuration of 
the practices of risk and uncertainty, we are compelled to rely on incomplete and 
inadequate explanations of how the statements of a private agency can adversely affect the 
capacity and prospects for national self-determination. Integral to the socio-technical 
agencement of control, ratings are the internal forms of governmentality instrumental in 
the depoliticization of this narrative.  
 Not only does this analysis refocus the debate on the act of (sovereign) rating, rather 
than simply being bogged down by the enigma of its institutional agency (CRAs), it also 
disturbs the hegemony of risk in the construction and administration of this space and 
subsequent asymmetry. Greater clarity and an enhanced understanding of the authoritative 
capacity of sovereign ratings are essential for the design of effective regulatory frameworks 
capable of intervening to mitigate industry excesses and managing crises when they do 
erupt. Without comprehensive governance, reversing this tide and reclaiming some of the 
lost fiscal sovereignty vital for democratic self-determination will remain quite challenging.   
 The main themes identified above are further elaborated in the course of five 
chapters. By identifying the numerous major financial scandals and fiscal crises in which 
CRAs have been implicated, Chapter 1 documents how the severity and frequency of CRA 
involvement in these crises is increasing. Although each crisis has its own contingencies, I 
argue how the ascendance and significance of ratings and risk discourse is proving 
particularly problematic for democratic governments across the globe like never before. 
The embedded popularity of credit ratings in general is derived from their symbiotic 
relationship with the hegemony of risk management. EMU has only amplified and 
reinforced this movement; as the mitigation of currency risk via fixed exchange rates has 
shifted attention to credit risk and bond yield spreads.  
 Given the growing prevalence of sovereign ratings all across the world, it is quite 
odd that so few IPE accounts exist which document how their construction contributes to 
their authoritative ascendance and sustainability. Available analyses, however, lack the 
necessary analytical instrumentality to penetrate the seemingly hermetic enclosure of the 
ratings space. Applying dated categories and methods, their ability to open up technical 
expertise and its ‘scientific’ performance of finance to critical scrutiny is greatly 
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circumscribed. For this purpose, Chapter 1 introduces the main ‘deconstructive’ and 
‘reconstructive’ ethos of this book; through which significant conceptual themes are 
revealed that inform the remainder of our analysis: authoritative knowledge, 
performativity and the politics of resistance/resilience. Each one is developed as I excavate 
the territory of sovereign creditworthiness to show how it is constituted through its 
assessment and articulation.   
 Not only does this critical analysis expose the contingencies, inconsistencies and 
ruptures in what is often presented as a rational and self-evident technocratic process, but 
the problematization of sovereign ratings serves to disturb and diminish their 
depoliticizing effects; thereby allowing us to ‘test the limitations and the exploration of 
excluded possibilities’ (Ashley and Walker 1990: 263). Attentive to what Callon (1998: 36-
37) labels as ‘framing’ and ‘disentangling’, alternative knowledges of creditworthiness 
excluded or disqualified by a risk-dominant approach may now be revisited and may gain 
an audience in the continual renegotiation and reconfiguration of credit markets. At once, 
this ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ (Foucault 1980: 81-82) reveals the counter-
hegemonic discourses available across Europe and it sheds light on how intrusive ratings 
are in the rapidly expanding emerging markets (BRICs). Higher GDP growth and savings 
rates may allow these economies to absorb their governments’ considerable deficits for the 
interim. Nevertheless, their relative fiscal fragility and inflationary tendencies threaten to 
erode the value of accumulated savings, increase capital costs, and dampen investment; 
which could jeopardize these credit strengths. Substantial industrialization and societal 
pressures, such as growing inequality and environmental degradation, compound the 
challenges of modernizing their economies at a higher cost. Together these forces are 
increasingly straining the resiliency of their indigenous communities and traditions to 
remain relatively autonomous of Anglo-American budgetary conventions.       
Identifying the alleged offences and conceptual apparatus sets the stage for a more 
in-depth analysis of how this supposed immunity of ratings is acquired. Chapter 2 provides 
insights into the actual mechanics of sovereign ratings, their corresponding discourses, and 
governmental programs. How CRAs manage to command market authority, while 
remaining relatively immune from serious governmental interference in their business, is 
linked to the way that they appropriate and deploy risk and uncertainty as modes of 
governance. Here the analytics and operations of sovereign ratings are analyzed to reveal 
how their construction enables their social facticity. By dissecting the rating methodologies 
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employed by Moody’s (2008a, 2012a) and S&P (2011b), we come to terms with how 
attempts to calculate a sovereign’s propensity towards fiscal failure by using risk 
techniques similar to corporates or structured finance are riddled with inconsistencies and 
misrepresentations of uncertainties as risks. Although measuring fiscal variance through 
risk calculus fails to account for the uncertainty in framing budgetary relations, it does 
provide an appearance of objectivity which helps reinforce the credibility and utility of 
ratings. This chapter begins to reveal how ratings depoliticize the political economy of 
creditworthiness.  
 The question of how rating agencies are still able to exercise authority over the 
political economy of creditworthiness given their poor track record is related to the 
performative effects of ratings. In order to come to terms with this authoritative capacity, 
Chapter 3 expands on the government through risk and uncertainty introduced in the 
previous chapter. Here I build on, but go beyond, Sinclair’s (2005) seminal account to 
problematize specifically how the subjectivities and authorities implicated in the sovereign 
debt crisis are created and maintained. The analytical category of ‘performativity’ helps us 
grasp how ratings, as an internal form of governmentality, help produce the fiscal realities 
which they seek to describe by creating the conditions that serve to legitimize their 
epistemic framework and credentials. This relationship between action and authority is 
aligned with a self-systemic, and thereby self-regulating, logic of Anglo-American versions 
of capitalism. Studying meaning and materiality together, we come to a better 
understanding of how ratings act as a socio-technical device through which sovereign debt 
is made into a problem of government.  
Mapping how these calculative practices enable a particular socio-technical 
agencement is accomplished through the analytical tools of ‘deconstruction’ and 
‘reconstruction’. Through a diagnostic approach, I trace how these performative practices  
have self-validating/self-generative effects on CRAs, constitutive effects on investors, and 
prohibitive (unintended) consequences for beleaguered national governments. Together 
this matrix normalizes a volatile politics of limits, which privileges the discourse of risk over 
the government through uncertainty. Deconstruction exposes their ‘illocutionary’  and 
‘perlocutionary’ effects; as ratings communicate notions of fiscal normality which inform 
the constitution of a political economy of creditworthiness. Reconstruction demonstrates 
how based on this (dubious) knowledge, the performation of the politics of limits 
surrounding sovereign debt is tenuous and vulnerable to breakdown. 
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 Ultimately, this is a discussion about the politics of limits and who has the authority 
to decide and say what those parameters are. As experts deploy quantitative calculative 
techniques, such as ratings, they make qualitative judgments about democratic 
governments, which undermine their sovereignty. Chapter 4 focuses on how this fuels an 
antagonistic relationship between epistocracy and democracy. Whereas the (neoliberal) 
discourse of risk has become a hegemonic force, which has penetrated virtually every socio-
economic space, this chapter contextualizes this asymmetry by locating it in hot spots 
around the world where the redefinition of the politics of limits is most pronounced. 
Beginning with the most pressing of these episodes, namely Europe, I take stock of how this 
antagonism may develop and how regulators may inadvertently aggravate it. Given their 
faster growth rates but lower standards of welfare, the conflicts are not as disruptive in the 
emerging economies – for the moment. Increasingly more assertive, however, through 
bodies like the G20, the BRICs are on a collision course with the CRAs; it is merely a matter 
of time and severity. The economic turbulence and slowing growth, which started to rattle 
emerging markets by the second quarter of 2013, may only amplify these frictions.     
  Once crisis erupts, as fiscal sovereignty is excessively threatened, the terms of the 
political within the economy are revisited. Technical and depoliticized enclosures open up 
to test the limitations of excluded possibilities. By no means does this eliminate the 
significant role of expertise in political economy. But it does problematize epistocracy’s grip 
over democratic forms of rule and how authority is conceptualized and practiced. This 
allows us to consider if and how the repoliticization of market relations may constitute 
alternatives to the Anglo-American model of creditworthiness. Questions about its 
coherence and depoliticization of fiscal relations sets the stage for an investigation of what 
is being done to manage the ratings space.  
 In conclusion, Chapter 5 revisits the main themes addressed in the book while 
reflecting on potential future problems that may be looming on the horizon; namely the 
BRICs and America. Sanctioning informal judgment is not an easy task but regulators must 
be reminded that the simultaneous accommodation of both free financial markets and 
democratic constituencies under the current system is often untenable. Moreover, given the 
global scope of credit markets, for a regulatory program to be effective, it will require 
international commitment rather than lackluster regional schemes. Irrespective of these 
factors, one thing that can be said with certainty is that the severity and frequency of these 
crises is growing and there is no sign of the rating agencies losing this battle.  
